Improving Opportunities and Incentives for Saving by Middle- and Low-Income Households

PATH TO PROSPERITY, pp. 93-124, Jason Furman, Jason E. Bordoff, eds., Brookings Institution Press 2008

30 Pages Posted: 5 Feb 2011

See all articles by William G. Gale

William G. Gale

Brookings Institution

Peter R. Orszag

Lazard Asset Management

Jonathan Gruber

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: 2006

Abstract

Many middle- and low-income Americans retire without having accumulated sufficient savings to enjoy a comfortable retirement. Low retirement saving is not primarily due to a lack of eligibility for tax-favored retirement accounts, but rather to a lack of take-up. The low take-up, in turn, can be explained primarily by inertia and incentives. People do not enroll in a 401(k) or an individual retirement account (IRA) because such plans typically require specific actions to join and present confusing array of investment and contribution choices. Under current rules, not making a decision usually means not enrolling. Furthermore, the financial incentive to enroll in an IRA or 401(k) plan is often weak or nonexistent because the value of contributing money, and thus excluding it from taxation, depends on a taxpayer’s tax bracket - and the majority of households face a 15 percent or lower marginal tax rate.

We offer proposals to address both impediments to saving. First, we would require every firm (with possible exceptions for the smallest businesses) to enroll its new workers automatically in at least one plan: a traditional defined benefit plan, a 401(k), or an IRA. Businesses also would be required to set various features of the plans in a "pro-saving" manner, although workers always would have the option to override those "pro-saving" defaults. Second, our proposal would replace current tax deductions for contributions to tax-preferred retirement accounts with a new program providing universal matching contributions from the government for household deposits to 401(k)s and IRAs. Unlike the current system under which low-income households enjoy much weaker immediate incentives to contribute than high-income households, all households making a qualified contribution to a 401(k) or IRA would receive the same 30 percent match from the government. We also propose other changes to the retirement system to promote lifetime annuities.

Keywords: retirement, savings, IRA, 401(k)

JEL Classification: J26

Suggested Citation

Gale, William G. and Orszag, Peter R. and Gruber, Jonathan, Improving Opportunities and Incentives for Saving by Middle- and Low-Income Households (2006). PATH TO PROSPERITY, pp. 93-124, Jason Furman, Jason E. Bordoff, eds., Brookings Institution Press 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1754655

William G. Gale (Contact Author)

Brookings Institution ( email )

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Washington, DC 20036
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202-797-6148 (Phone)
202-797-6181 (Fax)

Peter R. Orszag

Lazard Asset Management ( email )

30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, NY 10112
United States

Jonathan Gruber

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

50 Memorial Drive
Room E52-355
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-8892 (Phone)
617-253-1330 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://web.mit.edu/gruberj/www/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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