Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

The L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially Optimal Private Foundation Investment in Entrepreneurial Ventures

23 Pages Posted: 4 Feb 2011 Last revised: 21 Oct 2011

J. William Callison

Faegre Baker Daniels LLP

Allan Vestal

Drake University Law School

Date Written: September 1, 2010

Abstract

This paper considers low-profit limited liability companies (L3Cs). It determines that the L3C status provides no advantages regarding two of the stated reasons for the concept, namely enabling foundations to make program related investments and providing clearer fiduciary duty/governance rules, and concludes that the L3C form has little or no value and should be abandoned.

Keywords: limited liability company, low-profit limited liability company, program related investment, L3C

Suggested Citation

Callison, J. William and Vestal, Allan, The L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially Optimal Private Foundation Investment in Entrepreneurial Ventures (September 1, 2010). Drake University Law School Research Paper No. 11-07; Vermont Law Review, Vol. 35, p. 273, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1755283

J. William Callison (Contact Author)

Faegre Baker Daniels LLP ( email )

1700 Lincoln St. #3200
Denver, CO 80203
United States

Allan Vestal

Drake University Law School ( email )

27th & Carpenter Sts.
Des Moines, IA 50311
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
453
Rank
51,554
Abstract Views
2,316