54 Pages Posted: 7 Feb 2011
Date Written: February 2011
This paper studies overborrowing, financial crises and macro-prudential policy in an equilibrium model of business cycles and asset prices with collateral constraints. Agents in a decentralized competitive equilibrium do not internalize the negative effects of asset fire-sales on the value of other agents' assets and hence "they borrow too much" ex ante, compared with a constrained social planner who internalizes these effects. Average debt and leverage ratios are slightly larger in the competitive equilibrium, but the incidence and magnitude of financial crises are much larger. Excess asset returns, Sharpe ratios and the market price of risk are also much larger. State-contigent taxes on debt and dividends of about 1 and -0.5 percent on average respectively support the planner’s allocations as a competitive equilibrium and increase social welfare.
Keywords: Borrowing, Business cycles, Credit, Economic models, Financial crisis, Global Financial Crisis 2008-2009
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Bianchi, Javier and Mendoza, Enrique G., Overborrowing, Financial Crises and ‘Macro-Prudential’ Policy? (February 2011). IMF Working Papers, Vol. , pp. 1-53, 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1755441