A Generalized Tullock Contest

14 Pages Posted: 8 Feb 2011

See all articles by Roman M. Sheremeta

Roman M. Sheremeta

Case Western Reserve University

Subhasish M. Chowdhury

University of Bath - Department of Economics

Date Written: March 1, 2010

Abstract

We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning or losing, the payoff of a player is a linear function of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival. This structure nests a number of existing contests in the literature and can be used to analyze new types of contests. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium and show that small parameter modifications may lead to substantially different types of contests and hence different equilibrium effort levels.

Keywords: rent-seeking, contest, spillover

JEL Classification: C72, D72, D74

Suggested Citation

Sheremeta, Roman M. and Chowdhury, Subhasish M., A Generalized Tullock Contest (March 1, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1755604 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1755604

Roman M. Sheremeta (Contact Author)

Case Western Reserve University ( email )

10900 Euclid Ave.
Cleveland, OH 44106
United States

Subhasish M. Chowdhury

University of Bath - Department of Economics ( email )

Claverton Down
Bath, BA2 7AY
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/subhasishmc/

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