Expenditures and Information Disclosure in Two-Stage Political Contests

24 Pages Posted: 6 Feb 2011

Date Written: December 17, 2009

Abstract

This laboratory experiment studies two-stage contests between political parties. In the first stage, parties run their primaries and in the second stage the winners of the primaries compete in the general election. The resource expenditures in the first stage by the winning candidates are partially or fully carried over to the second stage. Experimental results support all major theoretical predictions: the first stage expenditures and the total expenditures increase, while the second stage expenditures decrease in the carryover rate. Consistent with the theory, the total expenditures increase in the number of candidates and the number of parties. Contrary to the theory, however, expenditures in both stages of the competition exceed theoretical predictions. Disclosing information about the opponent’s expenditures in the first stage increases the second stage expenditures and decreases the first stage expenditures.

Keywords: political contest, experiments, information uncertainty, over-expenditures

JEL Classification: C72, C91, D72

Suggested Citation

Sheremeta, Roman M., Expenditures and Information Disclosure in Two-Stage Political Contests (December 17, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1755606 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1755606

Roman M. Sheremeta (Contact Author)

Case Western Reserve University ( email )

10900 Euclid Ave.
Cleveland, OH 44106
United States

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