Behavioral Spillovers in Coordination Games

34 Pages Posted: 8 Feb 2011 Last revised: 18 Dec 2012

See all articles by Roman M. Sheremeta

Roman M. Sheremeta

Case Western Reserve University

Timothy N. Cason

Purdue University - Krannert School of Management

Anya Samek

Center for Economic and Social Research (CESR); University of Southern California - Department of Economics

Date Written: November 1, 2010

Abstract

Motivated by problems of coordination failure observed in weak-link games, we experimentally investigate behavioral spillovers for order-statistic coordination games. Subjects play the minimum- and median-effort coordination games simultaneously and sequentially. The results show the precedent for cooperative behavior spills over from the median game to the minimum game when the games are played sequentially, but not when they are played simultaneously. Moreover, spillover occurs even when group composition changes, although the effect is not as strong. We also find that the precedent for uncooperative behavior does not spill over from the minimum game to the median game. These findings suggest guidelines for increasing cooperative behavior within organizations.

Keywords: coordination, order-statistic games, experiments, cooperation, minimum game, behavioral spillover

JEL Classification: C72, C91

Suggested Citation

Sheremeta, Roman M. and Cason, Timothy N. and Samek, Anya, Behavioral Spillovers in Coordination Games (November 1, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1755609 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1755609

Roman M. Sheremeta (Contact Author)

Case Western Reserve University ( email )

10900 Euclid Ave.
Cleveland, OH 44106
United States

Timothy N. Cason

Purdue University - Krannert School of Management ( email )

1310 Krannert Building
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States
765-494-1737 (Phone)

Anya Samek

Center for Economic and Social Research (CESR) ( email )

635 Downey Way
Los Angeles, CA 90089-3332
United States

University of Southern California - Department of Economics ( email )

3620 South Vermont Ave. Kaprielian (KAP) Hall, 300
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
125
Abstract Views
921
rank
226,072
PlumX Metrics