Simultaneous Decision-Making in Competitive and Cooperative Environments

32 Pages Posted: 8 Feb 2011 Last revised: 6 Mar 2012

See all articles by Roman M. Sheremeta

Roman M. Sheremeta

Case Western Reserve University

Anya Samek

Center for Economic and Social Research (CESR); University of Southern California - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 5, 2012

Abstract

We experimentally investigate simultaneous decision-making in two contrasting environments: one that encourages competition (lottery contest) and one that encourages cooperation (public good game). We find that simultaneous participation in the public good game affects behavior in the contest, decreasing sub-optimal overbidding. Contributions to the public good are not affected by participation in the contest. The direction of behavioral spillover is explained by differences in strategic uncertainty and path-dependence across games. Our design allows us to compare preferences for cooperation and competition. We find that in early periods, there is a negative correlation between decisions in competitive and in cooperative environments.

Keywords: cooperation, competition, public goods, contests, experiments, behavioral spillover

JEL Classification: C72, C91

Suggested Citation

Sheremeta, Roman M. and Samek, Anya, Simultaneous Decision-Making in Competitive and Cooperative Environments (March 5, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1755612 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1755612

Roman M. Sheremeta (Contact Author)

Case Western Reserve University ( email )

10900 Euclid Ave.
Cleveland, OH 44106
United States

Anya Samek

Center for Economic and Social Research (CESR) ( email )

635 Downey Way
Los Angeles, CA 90089-3332
United States

University of Southern California - Department of Economics ( email )

3620 South Vermont Ave. Kaprielian (KAP) Hall, 300
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

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