Democracy and Resilient Pro-Social Behavioral Change: An Experimental Study
35 Pages Posted: 7 Feb 2011 Last revised: 4 Jun 2015
Date Written: April 2014
Abstract
Recent experimental research has shown that a policy put in place endogenously (i.e., through their votes) can be more effective at inducing cooperation in dilemma situations. This paper shows that a similar result holds when a mild sanction is implemented in a voluntary contribution dilemma. Moreover, the effect of endogenous selection of the policy influences the behavior of those concerned even in their interactions in an exogenous setting. The strongest positive democracy effects are seen with those who are favorable of introducing the policy; and especially those whose cooperative dispositions are near the median of the sample and male subjects.
Keywords: cooperation, democracy, experiment, public goods, social dilemma, treatment effect
JEL Classification: C91, C92, D70, D72, D78, H41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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