Corporate Governance Reforms, Interlocking Directorship Networks and Company Value in Italy (1998-2007)

32 Pages Posted: 8 Feb 2011

See all articles by Carlo Drago

Carlo Drago

University of Rome "Niccolò Cusano"

Francesco Millo

Bonfiglioli Group

Roberto Ricciuti

University of Verona - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Paolo Santella

Single Resolution Board

Date Written: January 31, 2011

Abstract

In this paper we contribute to the literature on the structure of interlocking directorship networks and to the literature on the relationship between corporate governance and performance. We use a unique dataset made of corporate governance variables related to the board size and interlocking directorships of the Italian companies listed in the stock exchange over 1998-2007. We find that the corporate governance reforms introduced over the period considered have shown some effectiveness by slightly dispersing the network of companies. Moreover, we find robust evidence that interlocking directorships has been negatively related with company performance.

Keywords: corporate governance, interlocking directorships, company performance, social network analysis

JEL Classification: C140, C230, G340, L140, M210

Suggested Citation

Drago, Carlo and Millo, Francesco and Ricciuti, Roberto and Santella, Paolo, Corporate Governance Reforms, Interlocking Directorship Networks and Company Value in Italy (1998-2007) (January 31, 2011). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3322, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1756575 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1756575

Carlo Drago

University of Rome "Niccolò Cusano" ( email )

Via Don Carlo Gnocchi, 3
Rome, 00166
Italy

Francesco Millo

Bonfiglioli Group ( email )

Via papa giovanni XXIII 7 c/o Bonfiglioli RIduttor
Lippo di Caldereara, Bologna, Bologna 40012
Italy

Roberto Ricciuti (Contact Author)

University of Verona - Department of Economics ( email )

Via dell'Artigliere, 8
37129 Verona
Italy

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Paolo Santella

Single Resolution Board

Rue de la Science 27
Bruxelles, 1000
Belgium

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