Economic Efficiency and the Proceduralisation of Company Law

Posted: 15 Sep 1999

See all articles by Simon Deakin

Simon Deakin

University of Cambridge - Centre for Business Research (CBR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law

Alan Hughes

University of Cambridge - Centre for Business Research (CBR)

Abstract

This paper extends the analysis carried out by the authors for the UK Law Commissions and published as Part 3 of the joint "Consultation Paper on Directors' Duties" (1998). After considering some of the potential uses of economics in company law, the paper develops a theoretical framework which relates company law to a wider set of corporate governance mechanisms that operate to mitigate risk and uncertainty in contractual relations. This framework is then applied to provisions relating to self-dealing and conflicts of interests under Part X of the Companies Act 1985. It is argued that in this and related contexts, the economic role of company law should be seen as promoting cooperation and the sharing of information and risk between corporate actors, a function described in terms of the 'proceduralisation' of company law.

Suggested Citation

Deakin, Simon F. and Hughes, Alan, Economic Efficiency and the Proceduralisation of Company Law. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=175663

Simon F. Deakin (Contact Author)

University of Cambridge - Centre for Business Research (CBR) ( email )

Top Floor, Judge Business School Building
Trumpington Street
Cambridge, CB2 1AG
United Kingdom
+ 44 1223 335243 (Phone)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law ( email )

10 West Road
Cambridge, CB3 9DZ
United Kingdom

Alan Hughes

University of Cambridge - Centre for Business Research (CBR) ( email )

Top Floor, Judge Business School Building
Trumpington Street
Cambridge, CB2 1AG
United Kingdom
+44 1223 765335 (Phone)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
1,238
PlumX Metrics