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Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services

Posted: 8 Feb 2011  

Peter Cramton

University of Maryland - Department of Economics

Evan Kwerel

Federal Communications Commission (FCC)

Gregory L. Rosston

Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research

Andrzej Skrzypacz

Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business

Date Written: February 7, 2011

Abstract

Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communications. Effective auction design recognizes the importance of competition, not only in the auction, but in the downstream market for wireless communications. This paper examines several instruments regulators can use to enhance competition and thereby improve market outcomes.

Keywords: auctions, spectrum auctions, market design

JEL Classification: D44, C78, L96

Suggested Citation

Cramton, Peter and Kwerel, Evan and Rosston, Gregory L. and Skrzypacz, Andrzej, Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services (February 7, 2011). Journal of Law and Economics, Forthcoming; Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 406. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1757140

Peter C. Cramton

University of Maryland - Department of Economics ( email )

College Park, MD 20742
United States
301-405-6987 (Phone)
301-405-3542 (Fax)

Evan Kwerel

Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ( email )

Rm. TW-B204

Gregory L. Rosston (Contact Author)

Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research ( email )

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall at Galvez St.
Stanford, CA 94305-6015
United States

Andrzej Skrzypacz

Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-736-0987 (Phone)
650-725-9932 (Fax)

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