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Mechanisms for Eliciting Cooperation in Counter-Terrorism Policing: Evidence from the United Kingdom

56 Pages Posted: 9 Feb 2011 Last revised: 14 Feb 2011

Aziz Z. Huq

University of Chicago - Law School

Tom Tyler

Yale University - Law School

Stephen Schulhofer

New York University School of Law

Date Written: February 7, 2011

Abstract

This study examines the effects of counterterrorism policing tactics on public cooperation amongst Muslim communities in London, U.K. It tests a procedural justice model developed in the context of studying crime control in the United States. The study reports results of a random-sample survey of 300 closed and fixed response telephone interviews conducted in Greater London’s Muslim community in February and March 2010. It tests predictors of cooperation with police acting against terrorism. Specifically, the study provides a quantitative analysis of how perceptions of police efficacy, greater terrorism threat, and the choice of policing tactics predict the willingness to cooperate voluntarily in law enforcement efforts against terrorism. Cooperation is defined to have two elements: a general receptivity toward helping the police in anti-terror work, and a specific willingness to alert police upon becoming aware of a terror-related risk in a community. We find that procedural justice concerns prove better predictors for both measures of cooperation in counter-terrorism policing among British Muslims. Unlike previous studies of policing in the United States, however, we find no correlation between judgments about the legitimacy of police and cooperation. Rather procedural justice judgments influence cooperation directly.

Suggested Citation

Huq, Aziz Z. and Tyler, Tom and Schulhofer, Stephen, Mechanisms for Eliciting Cooperation in Counter-Terrorism Policing: Evidence from the United Kingdom (February 7, 2011). U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 340; NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 11-12. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1757266

Aziz Z. Huq (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Tom Tyler

Yale University - Law School ( email )

P.O. Box 208215
New Haven, CT 06520-8215
United States

Stephen J. Schulhofer

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States

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