Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Discretion and Prioritisation in Public Antitrust Enforcement, in Particular EU Antitrust Enforcement

32 Pages Posted: 12 Feb 2011 Last revised: 27 Nov 2013

Wouter P. J. Wils

King's College London; European Commission

Date Written: February 2, 2011

Abstract

This paper discusses discretion and prioritisation in public antitrust enforcement, in particular in the enforcement of EU antitrust law. First, the paper defines the notion of discretion and discusses the rationale of discretion. Second, it examines the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU by the European Commission, showing that the Commission has a broad discretion concerning the question which suspected or alleged infringements to pursue, but no discretion as to the content of the antitrust prohibitions. With regard to fines, the Commission has a significant degree of discretion, although this discretion is potentially neutralised by the General Court's unlimited jurisdiction. Third, a brief comparison is made with and between the competition authorities of the EU Member States, highlighting divergence as to discretion to set priorities. The last chapter of the paper sets out various reasons for allowing competition authorities discretion to set priorities as to which cases of suspected or alleged infringements of the antitrust prohibitions they investigate and pursue, as well as a number of risks related to prioritisation.

Keywords: antitrust, public enforcement, discretion, prioritisation, EU

JEL Classification: K20, K21, K40, K42, L40

Suggested Citation

Wils, Wouter P. J., Discretion and Prioritisation in Public Antitrust Enforcement, in Particular EU Antitrust Enforcement (February 2, 2011). World Competition: Law and Economics Review, Vol. 34, No. 3, September 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1759207

Wouter P. J. Wils (Contact Author)

King's College London

Somerset House East Wing
Strand
London, WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

European Commission ( email )

Brussels, B-1049
Belgium

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,111
Rank
14,794
Abstract Views
4,889