School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation

38 Pages Posted: 14 Feb 2011 Last revised: 11 May 2024

See all articles by Parag A. Pathak

Parag A. Pathak

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics

Tayfun Sonmez

Boston College; Boston College - Department of Economics

Date Written: February 2011

Abstract

In Fall 2009, officials from Chicago Public Schools changed their assignment mechanism for coveted spots at selective college preparatory high schools midstream. After asking about 14,000 applicants to submit their preferences for schools under one mechanism, the district asked them re-submit their preferences under a new mechanism. Officials were concerned that "high-scoring kids were being rejected simply because of the order in which they listed their college prep preferences" under the abandoned mechanism. What is somewhat puzzling is that the new mechanism is also manipulable. This paper introduces a method to compare mechanisms based on their vulnerability to manipulation. Under our notion, the old mechanism is more manipulable than the new Chicago mechanism. Indeed, the old Chicago mechanism is at least as manipulable as any other plausible mechanism. A number of similar transitions between mechanisms took place in England after the widely popular Boston mechanism was ruled illegal in 2007. Our approach provides support for these and other recent policy changes involving matching mechanisms.

Suggested Citation

Pathak, Parag A. and Sonmez, Tayfun, School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation (February 2011). NBER Working Paper No. w16783, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1759855

Parag A. Pathak (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

50 Memorial Drive
E52-391
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

Tayfun Sonmez

Boston College ( email )

Boston College - Department of Economics ( email )

140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States

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