Curing Spam: Rights, Signals & Screens

4 Pages Posted: 16 Feb 2011  

Marshall W. Van Alstyne

Boston University – Questrom School of Business; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School

Date Written: April 2007

Abstract

Recognizing spam as a pollution problem points to a market-based approach that could be more effective than prior approaches based on either technology or law. Combining insights from externality economics and information asymmetry, I argue that an imperfect market can create more value for users than even a hypothetical "perfect" filter.

Keywords: Externalities, Information Asymmetry, Signaling, Screening, Attention Markets, Coase Theorem

JEL Classification: C72, C78, D23, D6, D82, H21, O30

Suggested Citation

Van Alstyne, Marshall W., Curing Spam: Rights, Signals & Screens (April 2007). MIT Sloan Research Paper, Forthcoming; Boston U. School of Management Research Paper, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1762214 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1762214

Marshall W. Van Alstyne (Contact Author)

Boston University – Questrom School of Business ( email )

595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-358-3571 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://questromapps.bu.edu/mgmt_new/Profiles/VanAlstyneMarshall.html

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School ( email )

Center for Digital Business
5 Cambridge Center - NE25, 7th Floor
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-0768 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://web.mit.edu/marshall/www/home.html

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