4 Pages Posted: 16 Feb 2011
Date Written: April 2007
Recognizing spam as a pollution problem points to a market-based approach that could be more effective than prior approaches based on either technology or law. Combining insights from externality economics and information asymmetry, I argue that an imperfect market can create more value for users than even a hypothetical "perfect" filter.
Keywords: Externalities, Information Asymmetry, Signaling, Screening, Attention Markets, Coase Theorem
JEL Classification: C72, C78, D23, D6, D82, H21, O30
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Van Alstyne, Marshall W., Curing Spam: Rights, Signals & Screens (April 2007). MIT Sloan Research Paper, Forthcoming; Boston U. School of Management Research Paper, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1762214 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1762214