The Games of Monitoring Shared Local Government Services

Posted: 22 Feb 2011

See all articles by Eric Zeemering

Eric Zeemering

San Francisco State University


Shared and multijurisdictional models for service provision in local government are growing in popularity. City managers face new challenges in monitoring and evaluating local government services when their cities do not have sole authority over a shared local shared. As public managers craft strategies to address shared service monitoring, they must take into consideration the characteristics of the shared service arrangement. This paper uses game theory to illustrate two distinct games that managers face in monitoring shared local services under two different service sharing models, one in which the cities have a bilateral interlocal agreement, and one in which the local service is provided through a multi-member public authority. Predictions from these two models are evaluated with data from a sample of cities in the San Francisco Bay Area. This investigation begins to chart the challenge for developing sound theoretical explanations for the evaluation of shared local government services.

Suggested Citation

Zeemering, Eric, The Games of Monitoring Shared Local Government Services. Western Political Science Association 2011 Annual Meeting Paper , Available at SSRN:

Eric Zeemering (Contact Author)

San Francisco State University ( email )

1600 Holloway Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94132
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
PlumX Metrics