Electoral Competition and Political Corruption

Abstract

In this project, we examine the effects of electoral competition on political corruption. Specifically, we propose that electoral competition may facilitate some types of corruption, while mitigating others. We argue pressures of competitive elections may increase incentives for candidates and their supporters to violate laws that regulate the conduct of elections. We will examine if “election crimes� (defined by the DOJ as voter fraud and campaign finance violations) are more likely in competitive electoral settings. To examine this relationship we rely on data culled from the Department of Justice, Federal Elections Commission, and the Census Bureau. Specifically, we use information compiled by the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Public Integrity Section regarding federal prosecutions of elected officials, Federal Elections Commission data on electoral competition in the setting where the official broke the law, and census data regarding demographics of the setting. The project will advance extant scholarship by linking data on several years of federal prosecutions to the electoral context of the violation.