Incentives and Nutrition for Rotten Kids: Intrahousehold Food Allocation in the Philippines

29 Pages Posted: 28 Feb 2011

See all articles by Ethan A. Ligon

Ethan A. Ligon

University of California, Berkeley; Giannini Foundation

Pierre Dubois

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Date Written: December 2, 2005

Abstract

Using data on individual consumption expenditures from a sample of farm households in the Philippines, we construct a direct test of the risk-sharing implications of the collective house-hold model. We are able to contrast the efficient outcomes predicted by the collective household model with the outcomes we might expect in environments in which food consumption delivers not only utils, but also nutrients which affect future productivity. Finally, we are able to contrast each of these two models with a third, involving a hidden action problem within the household; in this case, the efficient provision of incentives implies that the consumption of each household member depends on their (stochastic) productivity.

The efficiency conditions which characterize the within-household allocation of food under the collective household model are violated, as consumption shares respond to earnings shocks. If future productivity depends on current nutrition, then this can explain some but not all of the response, as it appears that the quality of current consumption depends on past earnings. This suggests that some actions taken by household members are private, giving rise to a moral hazard problem within the household.

Suggested Citation

Ligon, Ethan A. and Dubois, Pierre, Incentives and Nutrition for Rotten Kids: Intrahousehold Food Allocation in the Philippines (December 2, 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1769916 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1769916

Ethan A. Ligon (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

207 Giannini Hall #3310
Berkeley, CA 94720-3310
United States

Giannini Foundation

UC Davis
Davis, CA 95616
United States

Pierre Dubois

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) ( email )

Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
39
Abstract Views
401
PlumX Metrics