Asymmetric Shocks in a Currency Union with Monetary and Fiscal Handcuffs

63 Pages Posted: 28 Feb 2011

See all articles by Christopher J. Erceg

Christopher J. Erceg

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Jesper Lindé

Sveriges Riksbank - Research Division

Date Written: January 6, 2011

Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of the asymmetric shocks within a currency union in a framework that takes account of the zero bound constraint on policy rates, and also allows for constraints on fiscal policy. In this environment, we document that the usual optimal currency argument showing that the effects of shocks are mitigated to the extent that they are common across member states can be reversed. Countries can be worse off when their neighbors experience similar shocks, including policy-driven reductions in government spending.

Keywords: Monetary policy, fiscal policy, liquidity trap, zero bound constraint, open economy macroeconomics, DSGE model

JEL Classification: E32, F41

Suggested Citation

Erceg, Christopher J. and Linde, Jesper, Asymmetric Shocks in a Currency Union with Monetary and Fiscal Handcuffs (January 6, 2011). FRB International Finance Discussion Paper No. 1012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1769934 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1769934

Christopher J. Erceg (Contact Author)

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

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Jesper Linde

Sveriges Riksbank - Research Division ( email )

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