Dynamic Intrahousehold Bargaining, Matrimonial Property Law and Suicide in Canada

Journal of Canadian Economics, 2003

29 Pages Posted: 28 Feb 2011

See all articles by Ethan A. Ligon

Ethan A. Ligon

University of California, Berkeley; Giannini Foundation

John Hoddinott

Cornell University, Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, Students

Christopher Adam

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: June 16, 2003

Abstract

This paper develops a dynamic model of household bargaining and uses it to motivate an empirical analysis of the impact changes in Canadian laws regarding the allocation of family assets upon divorce on female suicide. Using time series data, we show that in Ontario, the passage of Canadian legislation that improved women’s rights to assets upon divorce was associated with reductions in the rate of female suicide amongst older (married) women while not affecting younger (unmarried) women. As suggested by our model, its impact was asymmetric in that male suicide rates were unaffected by this change. We also exploited a quasi-natural experiment in these data, namely that no comparable legislative change occurred in Quebec. Here, we do not observe a structural break in the data.

Suggested Citation

Ligon, Ethan A. and Hoddinott, John and Adam, Christopher, Dynamic Intrahousehold Bargaining, Matrimonial Property Law and Suicide in Canada (June 16, 2003). Journal of Canadian Economics, 2003, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1769942

Ethan A. Ligon (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

207 Giannini Hall #3310
Berkeley, CA 94720-3310
United States

Giannini Foundation

UC Davis
Davis, CA 95616
United States

John Hoddinott

Cornell University, Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, Students ( email )

Ithaca, NY
United States

Christopher Adam

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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