Social Dynamics and Minority Protection

Posted: 28 Feb 2011

See all articles by Emanuela Carbonara

Emanuela Carbonara

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Piero Pasotti

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Date Written: December 1, 2010

Abstract

Minority-protection laws often differ over time and across societies. We show how the dynamic interaction between strong and weak social groups may account for these differences and their evolution. We assume that interaction occurs in a democratic environment, where representative institutions design norms according to the perceived voters’ support. Minority protection is strong when social reaction to discrimination is high. Interestingly, when discriminators harm members of weak social groups more if they do not react against discrimination, an initial increase in minority protection immediately reduces the level of social unrest, giving rise to fluctuations, as protest starts again when discrimination is back to high levels.

Keywords: Evolutionary games, Social dynamics Civil rights, Hate crimes, Minority protection

JEL Classification: K10, K42, D70, B52, Z13

Suggested Citation

Carbonara, Emanuela and Pasotti, Piero, Social Dynamics and Minority Protection (December 1, 2010). International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1769951

Emanuela Carbonara (Contact Author)

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 2
Bologna, 40126
Italy
+39 051 2098149 (Phone)
+39 051 2098040 (Fax)

Piero Pasotti

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli, 2
Bologna, Bo 40126
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/pieropasottiswebpage/

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