Securitization Rating Performance and Agency Incentives

52 Pages Posted: 1 Mar 2011

See all articles by Daniel Roesch

Daniel Roesch

University of Regensburg

Harald (Harry) Scheule

University of Technology Sydney (UTS) - School of Finance and Economics; Financial Research Network

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 1, 2011


This paper provides an empirical study, which assesses the historical performance of credit rating agency (CRA) ratings for securitizations before and during the financial crisis. The paper finds that CRAs do not sufficiently address the systematic risk of the underlying collateral pools as well as characteristics of the deal and tranche structure in their ratings. The paper also finds that impairment risk is understated during origination years and years with high securitization volumes when CRA fee revenue is high.

The mismatch between credit ratings of securitizations and their underlying risks has been suggested as one source of the Global Financial Crisis, which resulted in the criticism of models and techniques applied by CRAs and misaligned incentives due to the fees paid by originators.

Keywords: Credit Ratings, Collateralized Debt Obligations, Asset Backed Securities, Financial Crisis

JEL Classification: G20, G28, C51

Suggested Citation

Roesch, Daniel and Scheule, Harald, Securitization Rating Performance and Agency Incentives (March 1, 2011). Available at SSRN: or

Daniel Roesch (Contact Author)

University of Regensburg ( email )

Chair of Statistics and Risk Management
Faculty of Business, Economics and BIS
Regensburg, 93040


Harald Scheule

University of Technology Sydney (UTS) - School of Finance and Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 123
Broadway, NSW 2007

HOME PAGE: http://

Financial Research Network ( email )

C/- University of Queensland Business School
St Lucia, 4071 Brisbane


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