Motivation Crowding in Real Purchasing Decisions: Price vs. Quantity Based Instruments

55 Pages Posted: 5 Mar 2011 Last revised: 10 Sep 2021

See all articles by Grischa Perino

Grischa Perino

University of Hamburg

Luca A. Panzone

University of Newcastle

Timothy M. Swanson

University College London - Department of Economics and Faculty of Law

Date Written: August 26, 2011

Abstract

We present the first evidence of motivation crowding in real purchasing decisions from a field experiment in a large supermarket chain. We compare three instruments aiming to induce climate friendly choices: labels, subsidies, and product bans and neutrally framed versions of the latter two. Labels and bans activate intrinsic motivation of consumers. A subsidy framed as an intervention is less effective than either a label or an equivalent but neutrally framed price change, i.e. when combined, information and price change perform worse than each individually. We therefore find markedly different effects of price and quantity based instruments on intrinsic motivation.

Keywords: Motivation crowding, Prices vs. Quantities, Climate policy, Diet choices, Field experiment

JEL Classification: C93, Q18, Q54, Q58, H23, H41

Suggested Citation

Perino, Grischa and Panzone, Luca A. and Swanson, Timothy M., Motivation Crowding in Real Purchasing Decisions: Price vs. Quantity Based Instruments (August 26, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1775072 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1775072

Grischa Perino (Contact Author)

University of Hamburg ( email )

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Germany

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/gperinosite/

Luca A. Panzone

University of Newcastle ( email )

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NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE, NE1 7RU
United Kingdom

Timothy M. Swanson

University College London - Department of Economics and Faculty of Law ( email )

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United Kingdom
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