Prevention of Competition by Competition Law: Evidence from Unbundling Regulation on Fiber-Optic Networks in Japan

38 Pages Posted: 6 Mar 2011  

Naoaki Minamihashi

Göteborg University

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2, 2011

Abstract

This paper finds that a regulation that promotes competition in one market may decrease competition in other related markets. Policy makers in the telecommunication industry currently are facing an important decision about whether to continue unbundling regulations on new optical-fiber lines. I find that unbundling regulation prevents new providers from building optical-fiber networks, by estimating a dynamic entry game with a dataset of fiber-optic network constructions in Japan from 2005 to 2009. In particular, when a new technology is introduced, unbundling regulation has an oligopolization effect on the regulated firms. This finding in the Japanese telecommunications industry suggests that unbundling regulation during periods of new technology diffusion may reduce the price of service but also decrease competition in the infrastructure market.

Keywords: Unbundling, FTTH, Entry and Exit, Dynamic Game, Fiber-Optic Networks

JEL Classification: K21, L43, L96

Suggested Citation

Minamihashi, Naoaki, Prevention of Competition by Competition Law: Evidence from Unbundling Regulation on Fiber-Optic Networks in Japan (March 2, 2011). ISER Discussion Paper No. 804. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1775357 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1775357

Naoaki Minamihashi (Contact Author)

Göteborg University ( email )

Viktoriagatan 30
Goeteborg, 405 30
Sweden

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