Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests

9 Pages Posted: 6 Mar 2011

See all articles by Roman M. Sheremeta

Roman M. Sheremeta

Case Western Reserve University

Subhasish M. Chowdhury

University of Bath - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 16, 2010

Abstract

We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests and show that asymmetric equilibria may arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We also identify contests in the literature where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions.

Keywords: Rent-Seeking, Contest, Asymmetric Equilibrium, Multiple Equilibria

JEL Classification: C62, C72, D72, D74

Suggested Citation

Sheremeta, Roman M. and Chowdhury, Subhasish M., Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests (September 16, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1778623 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1778623

Roman M. Sheremeta (Contact Author)

Case Western Reserve University ( email )

10900 Euclid Ave.
Cleveland, OH 44106
United States

Subhasish M. Chowdhury

University of Bath - Department of Economics ( email )

Claverton Down
Bath, BA2 7AY
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/subhasishmc/

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