Download This PaperPatent Races with Dynamic Complementarity
Quaderni DSE Working Paper No. 733
47 Pages Posted: 9 Mar 2011 Last revised: 5 May 2020
Date Written: February 23, 2011
Abstract
Recent models of multi-stage R&D have shown that a system of weak intellectual property rights may lead to faster innovation by inducing firms to share intermediate technological knowledge. In this article I introduce a distinction between plain and sophisticated technological knowledge, which has not been noticed so far but plays a crucial role in determining how different appropriability rules affect the incentives to innovate. I argue that the positive effect of weak intellectual property regimes on the sharing of intermediate technological knowledge vanishes when technological knowledge is sophisticated, as is likely to be the case in many high tech industries.
JEL Classification: L10, O30
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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