Download This PaperIn the Forest of Value: Why Moral Intuitions are Different from Other Kinds
A NEW LOOK ON INTUITION IN JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING, pp. 209-229, H. Plessner, C. Betsch, & T. Betsch, eds., Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2007
22 Pages Posted: 12 Mar 2011
Date Written: 2007
Abstract
This book chapter discusses how and why moral intuitions are different from other types of intuitions.
Keywords: morality, intuitions
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Haidt, Jonathan and Kesebir, Selin, In the Forest of Value: Why Moral Intuitions are Different from Other Kinds (2007). A NEW LOOK ON INTUITION IN JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING, pp. 209-229, H. Plessner, C. Betsch, & T. Betsch, eds., Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1781235
Jonathan Haidt (Contact Author)
New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )
NYU-Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY NY 10012
United States
Selin Kesebir
London Business School ( email )
Regent's Park
NW1 4SA
London
United Kingdom
HOME PAGE: http://people.virginia.edu/~sk8dm
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Feedback
Feedback to SSRN
If you need immediate assistance, call 877-SSRNHelp (877 777 6435) in the United States, or +1 212 448 2500 outside of the United States, 8:30AM to 6:00PM U.S. Eastern, Monday - Friday.