Personal Religious Beliefs in the Workplace: How Not to Define Indirect Discrimination

19 Pages Posted: 13 Jul 2011  

Nicholas Hatzis

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law; City Law School

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 4, 2011

Abstract

In cases concerning indirect religious discrimination the claimant must demonstrate that an otherwise neutral measure has caused her to suffer a particular disadvantage because of her religion. In Eweida v British Airways the Court of Appeal held that personal religious beliefs which are not part of official religious dogma cannot be relied upon as the basis for a claim of indirect discrimination. I discuss, first, the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Eweida; then I examine the way personal religious beliefs have been treated in other cases in Britain and in the United States; finally, I place the issue in a wider human rights framework.

Suggested Citation

Hatzis, Nicholas, Personal Religious Beliefs in the Workplace: How Not to Define Indirect Discrimination (March 4, 2011). The Modern Law Review, Vol. 74, Issue 2, pp. 287-305, 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1781579 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.2011.00847.x

Nicholas Hatzis (Contact Author)

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law ( email )

Lady Margaret Hall
Oxford, Oxfordshire OX2 6QA
United Kingdom

City Law School ( email )

Northampton Square
London, EC1V OHB
United Kingdom

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