Does Nozick Have a Theory of Property Rights?

THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO NOZICK'S ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (Ralf M. Bader and John Meadowcroft, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 230-252.

Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 1782031

30 Pages Posted: 10 Mar 2011 Last revised: 18 Oct 2012

Barbara H. Fried

Stanford Law School

Date Written: March 9, 2011

Abstract

In the almost forty years since Anarchy, State and Utopia has appeared, Nozick's libertarian theory of property rights, laid out in Part II of the book, has been subject to innumerable internalist critiques. In this paper, I argue that the Nozick of Parts I, II and III, read together, holds at least three mutually inconsistent theories of property rights: utilitarian; libertarian; and anything goes, provided that citizens have some unspecified level of choice among legal regimes. If any of the three predominates, it is not libertarianism but utilitarianism.

Nozick is hardly alone in this regard. Nozick's inconstancy to libertarian principles is symptomatic of the problems deontologists of all stripes encounter in translating abstract articulations of rights theory into concrete rules. His de facto solution is typical as well: When the going gets tough, rights theorists tend to turn utilitarian.

Suggested Citation

Fried, Barbara H., Does Nozick Have a Theory of Property Rights? (March 9, 2011). THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO NOZICK'S ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (Ralf M. Bader and John Meadowcroft, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 230-252.; Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 1782031. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1782031

Barbara H. Fried (Contact Author)

Stanford Law School ( email )

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