The New Hungarian Rules on Damages Caused by Horizontal Hardcore Cartels: Presumed Price Increase and Limited Protection for Whistleblowers – An Analytical Introduction

European Competition Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 63-67, 2011

9 Pages Posted: 11 Mar 2011 Last revised: 14 Mar 2011

Csongor István Nagy

University of Szeged, Faculty of Law

Date Written: March 15, 2010

Abstract

The paper analyzes and evaluates the recently adopted Hungarian rules on damage liability in competition matters, which introduced a presumption that horizontal hardcore cartels lead to a 10% price increase and try to reconcile the ends of actions for damages and the leniency policy.

Keywords: Antitrust, Actions for Damages, Competition Law, EU Law, Hungarian Law, Leniency Policy, Private Enforcement, Quantum of Damages, Tort Law

JEL Classification: K13, K21

Suggested Citation

Nagy, Csongor István, The New Hungarian Rules on Damages Caused by Horizontal Hardcore Cartels: Presumed Price Increase and Limited Protection for Whistleblowers – An Analytical Introduction (March 15, 2010). European Competition Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 63-67, 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1783629

Csongor István Nagy (Contact Author)

University of Szeged, Faculty of Law ( email )

Rákóczi tér 1.
H-6722 Szeged, 6722
Hungary

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