Rational Treaties: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and International Bargaining
University of California at Berkeley School of Law; American Enterprise Institute
Cornell Law Review, Vol. 97, No. 1, 2011
UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1783750
This paper examines the continuing difference between the Constitution’s Article II treaty, and the congressional-executive agreement’s statutory process, to make international agreements. Rather than approach the problem from a textual or historical perspective, it employs a rational choice model of dispute resolution between nation-states in conditions of weak to little enforcement by supranational institutions. It argues that the choice of a treaty or congressional-executive agreement can make an important difference in overcoming various difficulties in bargaining that arise from imperfect information and commitment problems.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 36
Keywords: treaties, international agreements, bargaining, President, Senate, foreign relations
Date posted: March 13, 2011