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Rational Treaties: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and International Bargaining

36 Pages Posted: 13 Mar 2011  

John Yoo

University of California at Berkeley School of Law; American Enterprise Institute

Abstract

This paper examines the continuing difference between the Constitution’s Article II treaty, and the congressional-executive agreement’s statutory process, to make international agreements. Rather than approach the problem from a textual or historical perspective, it employs a rational choice model of dispute resolution between nation-states in conditions of weak to little enforcement by supranational institutions. It argues that the choice of a treaty or congressional-executive agreement can make an important difference in overcoming various difficulties in bargaining that arise from imperfect information and commitment problems.

Keywords: treaties, international agreements, bargaining, President, Senate, foreign relations

Suggested Citation

Yoo, John, Rational Treaties: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and International Bargaining. Cornell Law Review, Vol. 97, No. 1, 2011; UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1783750. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1783750

John Choon Yoo (Contact Author)

University of California at Berkeley School of Law ( email )

Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
510-643-5089 (Phone)
510-643-2673 (Fax)

American Enterprise Institute ( email )

1789 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
United States

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