Personal Bankruptcy Law, Fresh Start and Judicial Practice

15 Pages Posted: 18 Mar 2011

See all articles by Régis Blazy

Régis Blazy

University of Strasbourg

Bertrand Chopard

University of Angers - Bureau of Economic Theory and Application (BETA)

Eric Langlais

EconomiX, CNRS & University of Paris Ouest

Ydriss Ziane

University of Angers - Bureau of Economic Theory and Application (BETA)

Date Written: February 21, 2011

Abstract

We explore in the French personal bankruptcy process the ways that judges perform with the possibility to discharge all the personal debts in exchange of liquidation of their assets. In particular, we give some empirical results on the determinants of judges’ selection between debtors whose debts are wiped out and debtors who have to reimburse their debts with their future incomes and current assets. Our main result is that French judges might prevent debtors from debt discharge when they are indebted to multiple creditors, especially financial ones. We give also empirical evidence that French judges would be sensitive when they make their decisions, to the regional labour market conditions as the higher the regional unemployment rate (in comparison to the mean rate), the higher is the likelihood of debt discharge. These empirical results are of prime interest to better understand how French personal bankruptcy laws perform in comparison to other national bankruptcy systems. Finally, our results can also serve to fill the gap between the bankruptcy rules and the practice of judges.

Keywords: Personal Bankruptcy, overindebtedness

JEL Classification: : G33, K29

Suggested Citation

Blazy, Régis and Chopard, Bertrand and Langlais, Eric and Ziane, Ydriss, Personal Bankruptcy Law, Fresh Start and Judicial Practice (February 21, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1784703 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1784703

Régis Blazy

University of Strasbourg ( email )

61, avenue de la foret noire
Strasbourg, Alsace 3000
France

Bertrand Chopard (Contact Author)

University of Angers - Bureau of Economic Theory and Application (BETA) ( email )

13, Place Carnot
Strasbourg, 67000
France

Eric Langlais

EconomiX, CNRS & University of Paris Ouest ( email )

200 Avenue de la République
Nanterre, 92200
France

HOME PAGE: http://economix.u-paris10.fr/fr/membres/?id=889

Ydriss Ziane

University of Angers - Bureau of Economic Theory and Application (BETA) ( email )

13, Place Carnot
Strasbourg, 67000
France

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