Credit Rationing in Small Firm-Bank Relationships

55 Pages Posted: 15 Mar 2011 Last revised: 22 Feb 2016

See all articles by Karolin Kirschenmann

Karolin Kirschenmann

Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Date Written: October 22, 2015

Abstract

I study credit rationing in small firm bank relationships by using a unique data set of matched loan applications and contracts. I establish the degree of credit rationing by relating a firm’s requested loan amount to the bank’s granted amount. In line with theoretical predictions, credit rationing is higher for opaque than transparent firms at the beginning of their bank relationships and decreases over time for both. After testing for several alternative explanations, the results suggest that information and incentive problems explain the observed credit rationing and its dynamics.

Keywords: Credit rationing, loan applications, small firm lending, asymmetric information

JEL Classification: D82, G20, G21, G30

Suggested Citation

Kirschenmann, Karolin, Credit Rationing in Small Firm-Bank Relationships (October 22, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1785414 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1785414

Karolin Kirschenmann (Contact Author)

Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )

Germany
+496211235351 (Phone)

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