Banks' Lobbying Determinants: Insights from the GFC and the Trump Presidency

58 Pages Posted: 15 Mar 2011 Last revised: 9 Sep 2021

See all articles by Rajna Gibson

Rajna Gibson

University of Geneva - Geneva Finance Research Institute (GFRI); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Alper Odabasioglu

Bank of Canada; London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Systemic Risk Centre

Date Written: July 31, 2021

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between banks' main financial and business characteristics and their lobbying intensity during the last two decades. A novel feature of our analysis is that we adopt a network perspective to measure banks' lobbying intensity. We find that banks are more likely to lobby when they are larger, less creditworthy, venture into non-traditional businesses and face higher agency conflicts. Next, we observe that subsequent to the GFC and with the announcement of the Dodd-Frank bill, there was a significant increase in lobbying undertaken by banks with higher revenues stemming from trading and securitization. Finally, during the Trump Presidency, banks with higher trading revenues lobbied significantly more.

Keywords: banking, deregulation, Dodd-Frank bill, Global Financial Crisis, lobbying, networks, Trump Presidency, Volcker rule

JEL Classification: G01, G21, G28

Suggested Citation

Gibson, Rajna and Odabasioglu, Alper, Banks' Lobbying Determinants: Insights from the GFC and the Trump Presidency (July 31, 2021). European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper No. 784/2021, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1785435 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1785435

Rajna Gibson

University of Geneva - Geneva Finance Research Institute (GFRI) ( email )

40 Boulevard du Pont d'Arve
Geneva 4, Geneva 1211
Switzerland
+41.22.379.89.83 (Phone)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Alper Odabasioglu (Contact Author)

Bank of Canada ( email )

234 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0G9
Canada

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Systemic Risk Centre ( email )

Houghton St
London
United Kingdom

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
507
Abstract Views
3,339
rank
82,589
PlumX Metrics