Quasimarket Failure

16 Pages Posted: 21 Mar 2011 Last revised: 24 Feb 2012

Peter J. Boettke

George Mason University - Department of Economics

Christopher J. Coyne

George Mason University - Department of Economics

Peter T. Leeson

George Mason University - Department of Economics

Date Written: 2011

Abstract

The efficiency of “quasimarkets” — decentralized public goods provision subjected to Tiebout competition — is a staple of public choice conventional wisdom. Yet in the 1990s a countermovement in political economy called “neoconsolidationism” began to challenge this wisdom. The neoconsolidationists use the logic of government failure central to public choice economics to argue that quasimarkets fail and that jurisdictional consolidation is a superior way to supply public goods and services in metropolitan areas. Public choice scholars have largely ignored the neoconsolidationists’ challenge. This paper brings that challenge to public choice scholars’ attention with the hope of encouraging responses. It also offers some preliminary thoughts about the directions such responses might take.

Keywords: Private provision, public goods

JEL Classification: B53, H40

Suggested Citation

Boettke, Peter J. and Coyne, Christopher J. and Leeson, Peter T., Quasimarket Failure (2011). Public Choice, Vol. 149, pp. 209-224, 2011; GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 11-36. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1786492

Peter J. Boettke

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
703-993-1149 (Phone)
703-993-1133 (Fax)

Christopher J. Coyne (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

Peter T. Leeson

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.peterleeson.com

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