47 Pages Posted: 23 Mar 2011 Last revised: 13 Aug 2013
Date Written: July 1, 2011
We examine how directors with investment banking experience affect a firm’s acquisition behavior. We find that the presence of investment banker directors is associated with a higher probability of subsequent acquisitions, and such positive relation is not driven by reverse causality. Focusing on firms that make acquisitions, we find that acquirers with investment banker directors on the board have significantly higher announcement returns. The positive effect is more pronounced when the deal is more important and when the bankers’ experience and/or network is current. For the sample of large deals, we find that the presence of investment banker directors is associated with lower target announcement returns and takeover premium, consistent with the view that investment banker directors assist in determining and/or negotiating the price for their shareholders in important deals. In addition, we find financial advisory fees paid to outside advisors are significantly lower when there are investment bankers on the board. The presence of investment banker directors is also positively related to the long-run operating and stock performance. Overall, our results suggest that directors with investment banking experience can affect a firm’s acquisition policy and that they help firms make better acquisitions.
Keywords: investment banker mergers and acquisitions
JEL Classification: G34, G30
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Huang, Qianqian and Jiang, Feng and Lie, Erik and Yang, Ke, The Role of Investment Banker Directors in M&A: Can Experts Help? (July 1, 2011). Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1787086 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1787086