Marriage and Managers’ Attitudes to Risk

Posted: 21 Mar 2011 Last revised: 15 Dec 2020

See all articles by Nikolai L. Roussanov

Nikolai L. Roussanov

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Pavel G. Savor

DePaul University - Kellstadt Graduate School of Business; affiliation not provided to SSRN

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 14, 2013

Abstract

Marital status can both reflect and affect individual preferences. We explore the impact of marriage on corporate CEOs, and find that firms run by single CEOs exhibit higher stock return volatility, pursue more aggressive investment policies, and do not respond to changes in idiosyncratic risk. These effects are weaker for older CEOs. Our findings continue to hold when we use variation in divorce laws across states to instrument for CEO marital status, which supports the hypothesis that marriage itself drives choices rather than it just reflecting innate heterogeneity in preferences. We explore various potential explanations for why single CEOs may be less risk-averse.

Keywords: CEOs, idiosyncratic risk, status concerns

JEL Classification: G02, G30, G32, J12, K36

Suggested Citation

Roussanov, Nikolai L. and Savor, Pavel G., Marriage and Managers’ Attitudes to Risk (December 14, 2013). AFA 2013 San Diego Meetings Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1787381 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1787381

Nikolai L. Roussanov (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Pavel G. Savor

DePaul University - Kellstadt Graduate School of Business ( email )

1 E. Jackson Blvd.
Chicago, IL
United States

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
9,353
PlumX Metrics