Double Intermediation in IPOs: Double the Trouble?

40 Pages Posted: 22 Mar 2011

See all articles by Ozgur Ince

Ozgur Ince

University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business

Date Written: February 15, 2011

Abstract

This study investigates the role of repeated interactions between venture capital firms and unaffiliated investment banks in the IPO process. Our main findings are threefold. First, we find strong evidence of venture capital investors’ influence on their portfolio firms’ underwriter choice towards relationship banks. Second, relationship banks are more likely to underwrite IPOs with more severe information asymmetry and agency problems. Finally, underpricing is significantly lower if the IPO is underwritten by a relationship bank, driven by both a reduction in information asymmetry problems and a better alignment of incentives. Overall, our results indicate that relationships play a beneficial role in the IPO process.

Keywords: Relationship intermediation, Initial Public Offerings, Investment Banking, Venture Capital

JEL Classification: G24

Suggested Citation

Ince, Ozgur S., Double Intermediation in IPOs: Double the Trouble? (February 15, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1787401 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1787401

Ozgur S. Ince (Contact Author)

University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business ( email )

1014 Greene Street
Columbia, SC 29208
United States
(803) 777-4905 (Phone)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
77
Abstract Views
672
rank
312,250
PlumX Metrics