An Economic Interpretation of the Pashtunwalli

21 Pages Posted: 23 Mar 2011 Last revised: 22 Apr 2011

Tom Ginsburg

University of Chicago Law School

Date Written: March 16, 2011

Abstract

This essay analyzes the Pashtunwalli, the tribal code of the Pashtuns, from a political economy perspective. Though it bears some similarity with customary laws of other Afghan tribes, the Pashtun customs are distinctive both for their persistence and harshness. The norms of the Pashtunwalli provide an illustration of the logic of retaliation in private legal systems as well as an institutional solution – the jirga – to minimize the threat of escalation. The paper also considers two normative problems associated with the Pashtunwalli: gender inequities and relatively high levels of violence. It considers a simple strategy for introducing greater normative coherence to the Pashtunwalli that might also ameliorate its morally troubling aspects – the expansion of literacy. While not a panacea, greater levels of education could potentially facilitate clearer substantive norms as well as improved quality of life for women.

Keywords: legal pluralism, private ordering

JEL Classification: K00

Suggested Citation

Ginsburg, Tom, An Economic Interpretation of the Pashtunwalli (March 16, 2011). University of Chicago Legal Forum, Forthcoming; U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 548. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1788523

Tom Ginsburg (Contact Author)

University of Chicago Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
536
Rank
40,427
Abstract Views
1,356