Monetary Policy and Central Bank Independence: Economics and Politics - A Primer

17 Pages Posted: 26 Mar 2011  

Donato Masciandaro

Bocconi University - Department of Economics

Date Written: March 1, 2011

Abstract

In these notes we address the question of Central Bank Independence (hereafter CBI). We use a principal-agent model of the institutional regime. Citizens are the principals who demand CBI and the incumbent government is the agent which establishes the central bank regime, supplying it.

Suggested Citation

Masciandaro, Donato, Monetary Policy and Central Bank Independence: Economics and Politics - A Primer (March 1, 2011). Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper No. 2011-85. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1791463 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1791463

Donato Masciandaro (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy

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