Envy and Agricultural Innovation: An Experimental Case Study from Ethiopia

Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) Discussion Paper 11-12

Centre for the Study of African Economies (University of Oxford) 2011-06

45 Pages Posted: 29 Mar 2011

See all articles by Bereket Kebede

Bereket Kebede

University of East Anglia - School of International Development and CBESS

Daniel John Zizzo

University of Queensland - School of Economics

Date Written: March 23, 2011

Abstract

The underlying motivations for envy or related social preferences and their impact on agricultural innovations are examined by combining data from money burning experimental game and household survey from Ethiopia. In the first stage of the money burning experimental game, income inequality is induced by providing different endowments and playing a lottery. In the second, people are allowed to decrease (‘burn’) other players’ money at their own expense. Conditional on individual behaviour, experimentally measured envious preferences from others have a negative effect on real life agricultural innovation.

Keywords: envy, social preferences, money burning games, agricultural innovations, Ethiopia

JEL Classification: C93, D03, O12, O55

Suggested Citation

Kebede, Bereket and Zizzo, Daniel John, Envy and Agricultural Innovation: An Experimental Case Study from Ethiopia (March 23, 2011). Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) Discussion Paper 11-12, Centre for the Study of African Economies (University of Oxford) 2011-06, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1793027 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1793027

Bereket Kebede

University of East Anglia - School of International Development and CBESS ( email )

Norwich Research Park
Norwich, Norfolk NR4 7TJ
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/bereket-kebede/

Daniel John Zizzo (Contact Author)

University of Queensland - School of Economics ( email )

St Lucia
Brisbane, Queensland 4072
Australia

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