Selfishness, Fraternity, and Other-Regarding Preference in Spatial Evolutionary Games

7 Pages Posted: 25 Mar 2011

See all articles by Gyorgy Szabo

Gyorgy Szabo

Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) - Research Institute for Technical Physics and Materials Science

Attila Szolnoki

Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) - Research Institute for Technical Physics and Materials Science

Date Written: March 23, 2011

Abstract

Spatial evolutionary games are studied with myopic players whose payoff interest, as a personal character, is tuned from selfishness to other-regarding preference via fraternity. The players are located on a square lattice and collect income from symmetric two-person two-strategy (called cooperation and defection) games with their nearest neighbors. During the elementary steps of evolution a randomly chosen player modifies her strategy in order to maximize stochastically her utility function composed from her own and the co-players' income with weight factors $1-Q$ and $Q$. These models are studied within a wide range of payoff parameters using Monte Carlo simulations for noisy strategy updates and by spatial stability analysis in the low noise limit. For fraternal players ($Q=1/2$) the system evolves into ordered arrangements of strategies in the low noise limit in a way providing optimum payoff for the whole society. Dominance of defectors, representing the ''tragedy of the commons,' is found within the regions of prisoner's dilemma and stag hunt game for selfish players ($Q=0$). Due to the symmetry in the effective utility function the system exhibits similar behavior even for $Q=1$ that can be interpreted as the "lovers' dilemma."

Keywords: evolutionary games, social dilemmas, selfishness, fraternity

JEL Classification: C70, C73

Suggested Citation

Szabo, Gyorgy and Szolnoki, Attila, Selfishness, Fraternity, and Other-Regarding Preference in Spatial Evolutionary Games (March 23, 2011). Journal of Theoretical Biology, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1793196

Gyorgy Szabo (Contact Author)

Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) - Research Institute for Technical Physics and Materials Science ( email )

P.O.B. 49
Budapest, H-1525
Hungary
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HOME PAGE: http://www.mfa.kfki.hu/~szabo/

Attila Szolnoki

Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) - Research Institute for Technical Physics and Materials Science ( email )

Konkoly-Thege u. 29-33
Budapest, H-1525
Hungary

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