Judicial Lawmaking and Precedent in Supreme Courts

39 Pages Posted: 26 Apr 2011

See all articles by Jan Komárek

Jan Komárek

iCourts, Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen

Date Written: March 23, 2011

Abstract

What does it mean for a supreme court to ‘make law?’ When is it possible to say that its decisions are ‘precedents?’ To what extent should a supreme court’s pronouncements be taken into account by others – lower courts and political branches? And how should these other actors reason with such precedents? This article shows how a particular approach to judicial lawmaking and precedent shapes answers to these questions and examines them in relation to the US Supreme Court and the French Cour de cassation. The findings are then used for a critical analysis of the European Court of Justice’s case law. It is suggested that while the US and French systems have found some ways of reconciling judicial lawmaking with the basic premises of their constitutional and political systems (although they are not entirely satisfactory), the EU system is still waiting for an account of the Court’s lawmaking and precedent. The conclusion indicates directions of possible further research relevant for all courts examined.

Keywords: judicial lawmaking, precedent, United States Supreme Court, French Cour de cassation, European Court of Justice, separation of powers, reasoning with precedent

Suggested Citation

Komárek, Jan, Judicial Lawmaking and Precedent in Supreme Courts (March 23, 2011). LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 4/2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1793219 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1793219

Jan Komárek (Contact Author)

iCourts, Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen ( email )

Studiestraede 6
Copenhagen, DK-1455
Denmark

HOME PAGE: http://jura.ku.dk/icourts/staff/profile/?pure=en/persons/591330

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
935
Abstract Views
4,003
rank
23,483
PlumX Metrics