Nondelegation Canons

University of Chicago Law School, John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 82

35 Pages Posted: 15 Sep 1999

See all articles by Cass R. Sunstein

Cass R. Sunstein

Harvard Law School; Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

Date Written: September 1999

Abstract

Reports of the death of the nondelegation doctrine have been greatly exaggerated. Rather than having been abandoned, the doctrine has merely been renamed and relocated. Its current home consists of a set of nondelegation canons, which forbid executive agencies from making certain decisions on their own. These canons forbid extraterritorial application of national law, intrusions on state sovereignty, decisions harmful to Native Americans, and absolutist approaches to health and safety. The nondelegation canons are far preferable to the old nondelegation doctrine, because they are subject to principled judicial application, and because they do not threaten to unsettle so much of modern government.

Suggested Citation

Sunstein, Cass R., Nondelegation Canons (September 1999). University of Chicago Law School, John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 82. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=179651 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.179651

Cass R. Sunstein (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

1575 Massachusetts Ave
Areeda Hall 225
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-2291 (Phone)

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
649
Abstract Views
4,524
rank
41,172
PlumX Metrics