Assignment Models and Reneging

Posted: 11 Apr 2000

Abstract

We consider a non-cooperative assignment model where we show that any subgame perfect equilibrium is stable, and that an appropriate refinement criterion leads to the p-optimal outcome. We then consider a model with reneging and derive some interesting properties of this game. We show that in this case 'unraveling' may occur. Furthermore, the resulting outcome can be either stable, or unstable.

JEL Classification: C78

Suggested Citation

Chowdhury, Prabal Roy, Assignment Models and Reneging. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=179759

Prabal Roy Chowdhury (Contact Author)

Jawaharlal Nehru University ( email )

CSDILE, School of International Studies
New Delhi
India

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