Performance in Private Equity: Why are General Partnerships’ Owners Important?
35 Pages Posted: 30 Mar 2011
Date Written: March 1, 2010
Abstract
Our study shows that the ownership of private equity funds influences the investments’ performances. Our analysis focuses on the universe of PE investments, made by Italian closed-end funds, from 1999 to 2005. We find that bank-owned funds are able to carry into effect a weaker monitoring of the companies in which they invest, because their representatives hold a plurality of offices in boards of directors of firms, either PE-backed or not. This leads to lower revenue growth of portfolio companies and consequently to lower IRR. On the contrary, corporate-owned funds are able to realize a closer supervision of their investments, realizing better performances.
Keywords: private equity, performance, ownership
JEL Classification: G24
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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