Campaigns, Political Mobility, and Communication

Gersbach, Hans

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1800564

Campaigns, Political Mobility, and Communication

ETH Zurich Center for Economic Research Working Paper No. 11/143

30 Pages Posted: 2 Apr 2011

See all articles by Hans Gersbach

Hans Gersbach

ETH Zurich - CER-ETH -Center of Economic Research; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

There are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 1, 2011

Abstract

We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the position choices of candidates would exist. With unrestricted financing of political campaigns two equilibria emerge, depending on whether a majority of interest groups runs to support the leftist or rightist candidate. The equilibria generate a variety of new features of campaign games and may help identify the objective functions of candidates empirically.

Keywords: elections, campaign contributions, interest groups

JEL Classification: C72, D72

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Gersbach, Hans, Campaigns, Political Mobility, and Communication (January 1, 2011). ETH Zurich Center for Economic Research Working Paper No. 11/143, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1800564 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1800564