An Economic and Legal Perspective on the Abuse of Dominant Position

16 Pages Posted: 3 Apr 2011

See all articles by Kevin L. Meyer

Kevin L. Meyer

Edinburgh University School of Law; St. Andrews University - School of Management; HEC Lausanne, UNIL; Pontifical University Comillas of Madrid - Department of Financial Management , ICADE; Wharton

Date Written: January 6, 2011

Abstract

It is widely accepted today that Competition Law, in general, should be used by the authorities to ensure the pursuance of social economic welfare. Many different aspects of the commercial world have been scrutinised by Law, but few fields have evolved as much or for that matter provoked as much turmoil and debate than Competition Law.

This paper focuses on the Article 102, which describes the activities prohibited to dominant undertakers. It first covers the main theories on the impact of companies being in dominant positions, and analyses the main way in which monopolies can harm the market. Then, it goes through the Article 102 through a few reflexions on its structure and intent. After this, the paper concentrates on the criteria used to assess dominance and abuse, and comments on the “Special Responsibility” that dominant companies endure.

Finally, the paper discusses the fairness of article 102 toward dominant companies.

Keywords: dominant, law, competition, abuse, 102, TFEU, article commercial, undertakers, Microsoft, special, responsibility, Europe, Eropean

JEL Classification: K21

Suggested Citation

Meyer, Kevin L., An Economic and Legal Perspective on the Abuse of Dominant Position (January 6, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1801285 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1801285

Kevin L. Meyer (Contact Author)

Edinburgh University School of Law ( email )

Old College
South Bridge
Edinburgh, Scotland EH8 9JY
United Kingdom

St. Andrews University - School of Management ( email )

North St
Saint Andrews, Fife KY16 9AJ
United Kingdom

HEC Lausanne, UNIL ( email )

Unil Dorigny, Batiment Internef
Lausanne, 1015
Switzerland

Pontifical University Comillas of Madrid - Department of Financial Management , ICADE ( email )

Alberto Aguilera, 23
Madrid, 28015
Spain

Wharton ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

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