Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=1803297
 


 



Auctions Versus Negotiations: Evidence from Public Procurement in the Italian Healthcare Sector


Mercedes Vellez


University of Rome II Tor Vergata, Faculty of Economics, Department of Economics and Institutions (DEI); Center for the Study of State and Society (CEDES)

January 5, 2011

CEIS Working Paper No. 191

Abstract:     
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on auctions and negotiations. Using healthcare facilities data on procurement contracts, I find evidence that auctions do not yield lower prices than negotiations. This result is robust to specifications tackling quality differences, endogenous participation, and the bilateral and multilateral nature of negotiated procedures. I also find evidence that late payments reduce competition and thus affect firms’ participation choices. A simple test based on Benford’s Law is used to rule out collusion among participants as a possible explanation of the results.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

Keywords: Auctions, negotiations, procurement, medical technology, competition, endogeneity, collusion

JEL Classification: H57, C36, I18


Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: April 5, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Vellez, Mercedes, Auctions Versus Negotiations: Evidence from Public Procurement in the Italian Healthcare Sector (January 5, 2011). CEIS Working Paper No. 191. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1803297 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1803297

Contact Information

Mercedes Vellez (Contact Author)
University of Rome II Tor Vergata, Faculty of Economics, Department of Economics and Institutions (DEI) ( email )
Via di Tor Vergata
Rome, Lazio 00133
Italy
Center for the Study of State and Society (CEDES) ( email )
Sanchez de Bustamante 27
Buenos Aires, C1173AAA
Argentina
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 591
Downloads: 121
Download Rank: 184,275