Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=1804602
 


 



The Diminishing Role of the Private Attorney General in Antitrust and Securities Class Action Cases Aided by the Supreme Court


Jarod M. Bona


Bona Law PC

Carl Hittinger


DLA Piper

January 10, 2009

Journal of Business & Technology Law, Vol. 4, p. 167, 2009

Abstract:     
The U.S. Supreme Court's 2008 decision in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlantic, Inc. illustrated a reformulation of the private-attorney-general model for enforcing federal laws. This case, which rejected another attempt to expand scheme liability in private securities actions to create a new class of defendants, recognized the possible harms from private enforcement. At the same time, it described alternative methods of deterring bad behavior – namely, state and government enforcement. Stoneridge thus follows a pattern of recent securities and antitrust Supreme Court cases that have scaled back on the private attorney general method of enforcement in favor of a more nuanced approach that limits the expansion of private litigation where the harms could exceed its benefits. This article won the 2010 Burton Award for Legal Writing Achievement.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 20

Keywords: Securities, Antitrust, Class Action, Private Attorney General, Stonebridge, Attorneys Fees, Scheme Liability, Trinko, Dura, Broudo, Credit Suisse, Billing, Leegin, Twombly, Bell Atlantic, Tellabs


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Date posted: April 9, 2011 ; Last revised: November 10, 2011

Suggested Citation

Bona, Jarod M. and Hittinger, Carl, The Diminishing Role of the Private Attorney General in Antitrust and Securities Class Action Cases Aided by the Supreme Court (January 10, 2009). Journal of Business & Technology Law, Vol. 4, p. 167, 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1804602

Contact Information

Jarod M. Bona (Contact Author)
Bona Law PC ( email )
4275 Executive Square
Suite 200
La Jolla, CA 92067
United States
858-964-4589 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.TheAntitrustAttorney.com
Carl Hittinger
DLA Piper ( email )
401 B Street
San Diego, CA 92101
United States
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